The US has always supported military coups d’état in Turkey. As of late, this has changed a bit, but still the US administration’s ambivalent stance when the Turkish military issued a threatening e-memorandum – that is, an anti-government declaration posted on its website – on April 27, 2007, was no attitude to be proud of, according to Yasemin Çongar, a prominent pro-democracy journalist in Turkey.
Referring to the US administration’s response to the April 27 memo, Çongar said: “They acted unethically. And I think this embarrassed them later.
They were embarrassed when the [Turkish] government stood up to the military, though they [the US] had failed to take a similar stance, and, more importantly, [they were embarrassed] by the reaction of people with democratic awareness in Turkey.”
She recently responded to questions from the Cihan Magazine, sharing her opinions on various aspects of Turkish politics and life.
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| Yasemin Çongar (Photo: Kürşat Bayhan) |
While answering our questions, Çongar elaborated on wide range of issues.
You moved from the mainstream media to a paper that has a limited readership? Why did you decide to accept their offer?
They asked whether I could be crazy, I said I could. Alev Er, Ahmet Altan and I had dinner together. They explained the paper they had in mind. It was the kind of paper I wanted to be working for. I thought we wouldn’t be able to make money; we could go bankrupt; we could have serious difficulties. I knew all this, but I also knew the limits of the mainstream media. I had been in the US for 13 years; I missed Turkey a lot, so I decided to give the project a try. What Alev and Ahmet wanted to do was something that nobody had ever tried in Turkey; for this reason, I showed no hesitation.
What kind of paper did you imagine? Do you see that dream fulfilled?
Taraf, in terms of its impact in Turkey, has been more successful than I thought it would be at the beginning. We knew that we would do something that had not been done before and that this would make a difference. But we were unsure as to whether we would be able to sustain it and survive for long. It could have been a bold but short-term attempt; from this perspective, it exceeded my dreams. We have achieved our goals. At the beginning, this served as the slogan of the paper; we were saying, “They do not tell you the truth; we will make a paper that will tell the truth.” We did this, and we are still doing it. At the same time, we had many other dreams, including making more reports, embracing life more tightly, following the world, science, technology and art and producing high quality humor.
I would like to discuss your report on the Hudson Institute in 2007. Could you give some more details on the background of this report?
I heard that there would be a Hudson meeting. One of the guests called me to say that Turkish generals would also participate. I was not invited. When I heard from some of the participants in the meeting that there had been some strange discussions over there, I called everybody I knew who had been invited. I received information from five of them, and had extensive talks with three of them. I was told that they were there to discuss a weird scenario and that there was an argument between the Americans and another general who had resigned from the army because of his involvement in the Balyoz plan [a subversive plot allegedly devised by a clique inside the military] over the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK]. And I published it so that everybody would know about it.
‘Hudson report bothered Sedat Ergin’
Did you ever think that the plans discussed there would materialize?
There were two things that were weird. The first thing was the scenario itself, and the second was the PKK discussion. The Americans allegedly said: “What would happen if we capture PKK militants and surrender them [to the Turkish army]?” A Turkish general reportedly replied: “Do not do that, it would serve the Justice and Development Party’s [AK Party] interests.” That is weird, right? I published this. And of course, I also wrote about the content of the war-game scenario that would be discussed at the meeting, which was enclosed with the invitation. In that scenario, they [Turkish generals] sought to kill 50 people in a bombing incident in Beyoğlu. The scenario also said the president of the Constitutional Court would be assassinated. They wanted to test if there would be a ground offensive against Iraq [by Turkey] if this horrible scenario were to materialize. Back then, I was unaware of Ergenekon. But of course, I knew the deep state. The horrible aspect of the scenario was that it seemed impossible to implement and yet at the same time was feasible in some regards.
The General Staff made a statement after you published the report. In that statement you were actually referred to as a target. What was the approach of the Doğan Group – which has had a difficult relationship with the government in the past and has often been chastised for being pro-military -- and Milliyet, a Doğan paper and your employer at the time, after the statement?
In general, they were timid. But I said everything I could in my comments to CNN Türk. And I wrote everything I wanted to in Milliyet. Back then, Sedat Ergin was the editor-in-chief of the paper. The report bothered him. He published the report, but I think he had some doubts in his mind about whether or not to publish it. He told me, “This report could change the results of the general elections, are you aware of that?” I said, “Yes, but the report is accurate.” Sedat told me this as a careful journalist. I was sure because I had the scenario enclosed with the invitation and remarks and statements from three people. And still, I do not have any doubts.
What did you think when you saw the statement of the General Staff?
They were doing it all the time. Remember those days? The General Staff used to either ignore the reports that turned out to be true and authentic or attempt to undermine the image of the journalists who wrote the reports. They told many lies about many journalists. We all know what happened to Mehmet Ali Birand, Cengiz Çandar and Ayşe Nazlı Ilıcak. I was not surprised when they issued a specific warning for me. What surprised me was that such scenarios like the ones we mentioned were still being discussed. Scenarios are discussed all the time.
But I think that a scenario involving real people that is applicable to the situation in Turkey and gives the impression that it could be implemented by carrying out assassinations and murder of civilians is unacceptable.
‘We have an army hostile to religion’
What is the primary reason for the current state of affairs that the present coup plans were built on?
The Turkish army considered itself the owner of the country. It viewed itself as the absolute ruler. This has been changing after the coup plans, conspiracies were exposed. It did these things because it was detached from the people. It did not want the people to determine the political administration because it wanted society to remain within that fascist ideological framework, which was viewed as progressive. However, no nation can survive under that much pressure. Our army, with the indoctrination in military schools and the internal mechanism it employed, alienated itself from the people so much so that it became unable to feel the mental change in the country. We have an army that fails to appreciate that the Turkish people are transforming, which is hostile to religion. It is trained by one single pattern, and the democratic mindset does not fit into that pattern. But this is now changing. The army is being questioned. The coup plans are being questioned. Of course, the military bylaws should be changed and the mission of the military should be redefined to make sure that the military guardianship is effectively ended. The army should not be viewed as the guardian of the regime and it should have become apparent by now that its main job is to protect the country against external threats and that the military expenditures should be controllable. The military schools should have revised their curricula to focus on democracy.
Did the US play any role in the coup plans?
Yes, it did. During the Cold War, the US did not want any radical change in Turkey. They were scared that the people would become detached from the Western camp and would align with the Soviets or move in a different direction because of a Muslim awakening and that this would create an alternative to NATO and the US. It was doing its job by relying on the Turkish army. The March 12 and Sept. 12 coups received American support. The US turned a blind eye to the violations of fundamental human rights as well as the decline of democracy in the country. But the Cold War is over, and the Americans have decided to look at Turkey for who it is rather than for where it is. In other words, society comes before geography. In the past, they paid particular attention to the continuation of the guardianship regime. Now, Turkey is more important because of its society and the democratizing government. It is a secular and Muslim country that is trying to become democratic. This identity is valuable for the US. It is impossible for an institution that remains indifferent to Islam and makes it clear that it does not like democracy to stay the sole ally of the US. And another break was experienced on Sept. 11. Turkey, which, as a Muslim country, viewed itself as part of the democratic world and Western institutions, has turned into an ideal example from the American perspective.
You referred to the danger that Turkey might have moved to the side of Russia, but we have observed that the army moved to Eurasianism after the AK Party came to power. Why was that?
In the restricted partnership between the army and the US, there was no place for democracy and society. Once the Cold War was over, the US started to pay attention to democracy in Turkey. The army, on the other hand, saw that democracy was the end of its own guardianship and turned towards countries that did not pay attention to democracy like Russia and China. As a result, it detached itself from the Western institutions that were focused on promoting human rights and civilianization. Our army is one of the biggest in NATO, but its chief of General Staff is not subordinated to the defense minister. This is one of the main NATO protocols and Turkey does not observe it. I view the Eurasianism within the army as an escape from the West, democracy and popular demands. What we call Eurasianism is an isolationist view. It is an attempt to make sure that its own anti-democratic criteria are not questioned. It prefers to align with countries that will not question it.
‘Government’s response to April 27 embarrassed the US’
What is the reason for the American reluctance to adopt a strong position vis-à-vis the April 27 memo?
They could not see that the democrat mindset had matured in Turkey; they failed to appreciate that the government, the people and intellectuals would react to it. They made a big mistake. Of course, back then, there was propaganda like, “See, the modern Turkish youth in red T-shirts call the army to fulfill its mission on the streets.” The groups that we now know are part of the Ergenekon mentality used to carry out lobbying activities in the US. I think that considering the anti-government rallies and the columnists that praised those rallies, Americans thought there would be a coup in Turkey. The whole situation was presented to Washington as something led by the army that attracted the support of the people. Representatives of so-called NGOs told the US State Department that the military would not allow a person to be elected as president whose wife wore the headscarf and that a coup was imminent. In such an environment, the Americans were unable to understand whether the e-memo issued by the military had the support of the people, whether the government would oppose it or whether Turkey was at crossroads. They acted unethically, and I think this embarrassed them later. They were ashamed of the Turkish government’s response and more importantly, of the reaction by the people with democratic awareness in Turkey. Subsequently, the reality, with the anti-government rallies, became apparent. The US, which failed to adopt a strong position vis-à-vis the e-memo, expressed its support for democracy when the then-state secretary, [Condoleezza] Rice, changed her stance. After it saw the results of the July 22 elections, it had to adopt a democratic stance in respect to the presidency of Abdullah Gül. During the e-memo and presidential election process, the US was ambivalent.
‘We worked on the report on the Balyoz Coup Plan for days’
Do you think that these coup plans would have been devised had there been no change of policy in Cyprus?
Cyprus is important, but it is only one of the troubles as far as narrow-mindedness of the army is concerned. What is worse is that the military officers who were laying the ground for a coup sincerely believed that the regime would be gone, that Turkey would become another Iran, that our republican regime would collapse and that they should protect the legacy of [Mustafa Kemal] Atatürk. They were extremely ignorant and detached from the people. The coup-supporting officers believed that they were doing their job. They thought drafting reports at the [military] headquarters was their job and were doing it to protect the secular and modern state.
Could you talk about the overall situation in your paper when you received the documents from the Balyoz coup plan?
It was night; there was nobody at the paper. We were sitting with Ahmet Altan. Mehmet Baransu came in and said, “They showed me a bag of documents, I’ve taken copies of some of them -- they detail the coup plans of the first army division.” We did not hesitate as to whether we should publish them, but we had to review the documents, analyze them and find sources that would confirm them. We made a decision right away to set up a team that would work on this. Baransu’s wife was about to give birth. She was in the hospital back then. Baransu was going back and forth, while we stayed in the office; we worked many days like this.
Did you receive any reaction from your previous co-workers?
The lack of faith in this report was visible, with a few exceptions. A big slandering campaign was initiated. The present Balyoz suspects threatened Taraf on TV. After the report, they initiated a slandering campaign against my family. I signed the Balyoz report. They created Internet sites where they published lies. Part of the media wrote that nobody would believe such stupid coup plans. They would have almost argued that we, the three of us, had produced these 50,000-page-long documents and fabricated the whole story. We did not take them seriously. The originals of the documents came in and we surrendered them to the judiciary. And subsequently, similar documents were found in Gölcük and Eskişehir.
‘There are some records regarding the ‘Balyoz Plan’ which we never published”
Considering that you are still working on this, it seems that are still parts that have not been published, is that not true?
There might be some parts we missed, but we did publish everything we saw and thought was important. We turned in everything we had to the court. Of course, there are thousands of pages of indexed records that were not published. Things like various people’s family situations, private life details, who drinks and who doesn’t drink, whether so-and-so has a lover or not, does so-and-so go to mosque regularly or not; things like this. We never even considered publishing these things.
Did the “Balyoz Coup Plan” target the AK Party?
Yes, you could say this, but actually, it’s not all that important which faction it targeted. Our military, the moment they think they do not control those who have been elected enough want to take the reins in their hands, and either they intervene or keep plans for intervention just in case in a drawer somewhere.
We all remember how Alper Görmüş, the former editor in chief of the Nokta magazine, which was shut down after publishing excerpts from the diary of an admiral who wrote about the coup plans in detail as an ardent journal keeper, was left alone in that process when Nokta faced immense pressure from press prosecutors. Similarly, some media corporations ignored it when Taraf exposed the coup plan titled Sledgehammer (or Balyoz in Turkish), which was prepared by a group of army officers in 2003. What do you think is the reason for this?
We are very familiar with that reflex. Today some journalists still write in their columns without any shame that they assessed the election results with generals at the General Staff. A part of the media has always had close relations with the army. When the Taraf daily showed up and did something different in Turkey, a country where people who consider the army’s intervention in politics usual, who aren’t bothered by such interventions and who have never thought that a different kind of journalism may exist, are abundant in the media. Many of our friends have said to us, “We never thought that such a thing could be done in Turkey.” But it can be done. It seems that the reason why such a thing didn’t take place earlier is slightly because Turkey was underestimated. In addition to Taraf, Nokta was another example of the fact that such a thing could be done in Turkey. There is the fear that some may oppress us and that some may walk over us. However, at Taraf, there are more of us and we are stronger than our friends working at Nokta. Alper Görmüş was really alone. He had young friends with him but the support of media behind him was little and the publishers of Nokta couldn’t stand firm. We have a publisher who really stands firm. We have a publisher who doesn’t interfere in anything in terms of journalism and stands behind the work that we do. We are very lucky.
‘My husband isn’t a CIA agent, he is a CIA enemy’
In the meantime did you receive any threats that may endanger your life?
I received some threats but I don’t care about such things. I was just mad at what was done to my husband. Since he really had nothing to do with the CIA and can even be considered a CIA enemy and an opponent of America when his studies are taken into consideration; the campaign launched against him was actually very ridiculous. A person who has nothing to do with Turkey was targeted just because his wife works at Taraf. They thought they were denigrating me but actually they made the father of a little child the target and both endangered his life and also caused him distress. That isn’t something I can approve of. When a denigration campaign is kept on a personal basis, it is easier to deal with and it just distresses you. Moreover, if you know who is behind this campaign, you don’t care much about it. But the fact that such a thing was done to a foreigner who has no idea about the balances in Turkey and the actors in power in Turkey made me sick.
Following the 10th wave of Ergenekon detentions, which would have included former İstanbul Mayor Bedrettin Dalan had he not fled to another country, and during which many generals were detained and new coup plots were seized, the operations were interrupted for some reason. Why is that?
I don’t have the exact information about it, but according to my predictions now in terms of the Ergenekon investigation, it needs to be expanded to extend to much higher officials within the state and to the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), the heart of the state. On that note, the prosecution may be having difficulty getting information and there may be hesitation about contacting some of the intelligence agents on duty. The political will isn’t very encouraging on this issue.
What is Dalan’s role within Ergenekon?
I don’t know but I wouldn’t be surprised if he had a high position. The fact that he has fled the country makes one think he had a lot of responsibility in Ergenekon.
Could there be an operation to investigate higher officials suspected of having connections to Ergenekon?
There could be, there must be and one day there definitely will be.
How much of the media has been proven to have links to Ergenekon?
By reading and watching what is going on in the media, we see everyday that the Ergenekon mindset is very common in the media. I don’t know how many such people established an organic relationship with this corrupt organization that made assassination plans and terrorism plots and blacklisted people and carried out disinformation campaigns. I don’t know how many of them were questioned.
Do you think the fact that MİT and the army won’t the information they have on Ergenekon with the prosecutors has an impact on the fact that the investigation can’t go further?
Yes. The majority of the top brass in the General Staff and MİT are still immune. But questioning former police chief Mehmet Eymür and former MİT officer Yavuz Ataç as part of an investigation into unsolved murders may be a milestone.
Considering the Ergenekon indictment and the evidence, we can see that there are strange and complicated ideological and deep-rooted connections. Intricate links exist that extend from nationalist figures to neo-nationalist groups led by Dopu Perinçek [head of the Workers’ Party (İP) who is in jail as an Ergenekon suspect] from the business world to illegal leftist organizations and the PKK. What is the common point that these extremely different poles agree on?
You are talking about the shell, the guise, the mask. If you scrape the paint from the actors from these varying backgrounds that you mentioned, the same chauvinist and fascist face is revealed.
Is there a difference between the government’s determination to investigate the Ergenekon case and its determination in other gang operations? Do you think the government stopped fighting against gangs for a while?
The government is going through a period of recession. I hope this recession won’t affect the fight against gangs and I hope it won’t effect the prosecution, which is carrying out this fight effectively.
Former leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) Deniz Baykal spearheaded the ones who reacted strongly against the Ergenekon investigation. How do you perceive Baykal’s attitude and the scandal that he was involved in later?
Baykal protected the Ergenekon mindset and the Ergenekon defendants on all occasions and in the end he found Ergenekon watching him in his bedroom. What was done to Baykal was a totally immoral.
Thousands of people were judged in the Gladio investigation in Italy. Ergenekon is considered to be the biggest operation ever in the history of Turkish Republic. However, the number of those jailed pending trial doesn’t exceed 100. Isn’t that a contradiction?
For me, apart from very exceptional cases, Ergenekon defendants should be released by the court pending trial but of course serious precautions must be taken to ensure the defendants don’t flee. Although the Ergenekon case is being conducted more quickly compared to many other cases, there are defendants involved in the case that we should consider innocent until proven guilty. But they have been in jail for three years. I can’t consider this situation normal. The Gladio investigation took six years and only when Prosecutor Felice Casson was able to look in the archives of the Italian intelligence organization, could he understand the extent of the organization. We still cannot enter these archives in Turkey. We will consider the issue again once the archives are made accessible.
Why do you think the media, which was highly investigative in 1996 following the Susuruluk affair and revealed shady alliances between the police force, politicians and the criminal world, has failed to show the same courage in the Ergenekon investigation?
A part of the media is afraid of the Ergenekon investigation. I suppose there are journalists that are well aware of the plans they were part of in the past by negotiating with certain people, and I suppose these journalists are afraid that prosecutors may proceed in the investigation and discover documents implicating them. The majority of the media hopes the Ergenekon case will be closed so they can rest easy.
What are the differences between the media in Turkey during the Feb. 28 period and the current media?
The army is no longer a taboo. At least a part of the press has taken its epaulettes off. Additionally, now the journalists that have never worn uniforms and put on epaulettes have a stronger voice.
‘AK Party caused media to get sick’
What do you think the biggest problem with our media is? There are people who are very concerned about the future of democracy and free media in Turkey. What are you’re your thoughts about the future?
The biggest problem with the media is not being independent. The relations of media bosses with the government, army and various foundations are detrimental to the decisions of the newspaper and television administrators. At one end, there is a group of people competing with each other to flatter the prime minister and who consider what the prime minister says to be an order. At the opposite end are the ones who sometimes look to the army, sometimes to Ergenekon, sometimes to politicians, sometimes to the PKK and sometimes to the economic crisis in order to strike a blow to the government. The AK Party has caused the media to get sick. The pro-AK Party media isn’t the kind of media that clears the way for the party by criticizing it whenever necessary and that guides and directs the party. As for the media against the AK Party, they have a pathological hostility towards the party. We know about the shortsighted executive editors who have deceived their bosses telling them, “I swear there will be a coalition between the CHP and the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] at the end of this election,” for years. We know that all those writers who were mistaken in their predictions called the public “jar heads.” But the current media is more diverse, it has more varied tendencies than the previous media. In spite of everything, I am hopeful about the future.
‘Gülen movement doesn’t pay us’
There has been hearsay claiming the Gülen movement supports the Taraf daily. Are the rumors true?
There is no such support either financially or emotionally. I guess among the staff of our newspaper I am the only one who has met Fethullah Gülen personally. And that happened while I was working at the Milliyet daily years ago because of an interview. But you know, many things have been claimed about us, “We take money from Soros,” “We take money from Gülen,” “We are a project of the CIA,” etc. Considering these claims that we get that much money, I can’t see why we are this poor.
What is your opinion about the Gülen movement?
When you say the Gülen movement, you refer to a very large group of people. I don’t think it is a very homogeneous structure. I don’t just have one single idea about the people that come to my mind when I say “the Gülen community.” I know many different people who are involved with the Gülen movement. Among them, I have very good friends and there are also people I don’t like that much. I think some parts, some activities and some members of the movement are closer to me while others or more distant from me.
Whose idea was the headline ‘A prime minister befitting his general,’ which accompanied a story criticizing PM Erdoğan, who Taraf said was acting like then-Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt and angrily denying any flaws in intelligence or security that caused the deaths of 17 soldiers in a terrorist attack on a military outpost in 2008?
I guess it was a co-production. I remember that Ahmet Altan really wanted this headline but I don’t remember whether this idea actually belonged to him or who came up with the idea first in the editorial department. I think it was a very proper and suitable headline.
The prime minister sued Altan several times but then he dropped all his complaints. What do you think about this?
I think the prime minister doesn’t like being criticized. Yes, Ahmet Altan criticized [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan a lot. But the speech of the prime minister that caused Ahmet Altan to write such an article was a bitter pill to swallow. It was an unfair speech that sailed into Altan’s family. I think Ahmet Altan gave the best answer he could. The prime minister shouldn’t have filed any complaints against him. He just digs himself into a hole by being bothered by things like caricatures of him and by trying to get writers sentenced.
What kind of a portrait do you have in your mind about the prime minister?
I like his authenticity. I think he does very brave things but it seems he has reached the limits of his bravery and vision. I think if he had taken many of the steps he should have taken, Turkey would be in a better position today. Erdoğan did many things to democratize Turkey; he launched serious reforms but he couldn’t take the big steps daringly that would institutionalize these reforms. It is apparent that he stopped in terms of the Kurdish initiative. I hope the social dynamic that made the prime minister what he is now will be effective in the course of drafting the new constitution rather than populist opportunism. Although I respect the many things he has done, I don’t think the prime minister can catch up with that social dynamic.
Published on Sunday's Zaman, 22 January 2012, Sunday
