I am afraid 2012 will not be easy

Emre Uslu

When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) received 50 percent of the votes in the 2011 election and came to power by promising to make a new constitution, expectations were raised to expect a transformation of the system. But if you consider the aftermath of the elections, one cannot help thinking that it will be good if we just avoid having any troubles in 2012. What reasons are there to be so pessimistic?

1) The AKP government no longer responds to reasonable calls, with the exception of a group of people who contradict its own support base. You have to be naïve to be hopeful for an administrative approach where fairness has been replaced by nepotism. In addition, the AKP now makes every step by considering their plans for 2014. Three teams within the party are working tirelessly to make sure that their candidates become the next prime minister. Therefore it will not be wrong to argue that Erdoğan’s AKP is a lame duck. In this case it will be unrealistically optimistic to expect that the AKP would take even the most basic steps, let alone a reformist agenda.

2) It seems that the AKP has been in process of changing alliances. We now see people, who were strongly opposed to the AKP in the past, working with powerful actors in the AKP. The media outlets that did not previously support the AKP do not hesitate to approach the party for favors, and the AKP responds to their requests. Note that criticisms have recently come from media outlets that were considered supporters of the AKP in the past. Some even lost their jobs because of these criticisms. The AKP and its former enemies now sing the same song. The process of changing partners is not easy for the ruling party. A lot of problems may emerge in this process; for this reason, it seems that 2012 will not be easy.

3) Turkish foreign policy is even more complicated. Iran has been playing old-style Persian games. Some organizations that have been silent have recently started to wake up and issue declarations, as if they have been resurrected. A group close to Iran claimed responsibility for the attack against Turkey’s embassy in Baghdad. The list of these groups are the Al Quds Warriors, which murdered Uğur Mumcu, Muammer Aksoy, Bahriye Üçök and Tawhid-i Salam; reliable reports indicate that these groups have decided to regain their influence. The professional bomber of the Al Quds Warriors, who made the bomb that killed Uğur Mumcu, has not yet been caught. Considering that they are extremely professional, it could be argued that these groups will pose serious threats.

4) During this process the PKK will intensify its attacks as a separate actor. At this point Abdullah Öcalan’s most recent message is important: “The situation is pretty delicate; it is not proper to hold new negotiations.” Most probably, Öcalan may expect that this message will raise tension in the streets of Diyarbakır, where people showed their anger in response to allegations that he was mistreated in prison. To this end, it is a known fact that the PKK would like to intensify its attacks in the near future. But the PKK, which is unable to mobilize people on the streets because of the KCK operations, will act swiftly to use the recent move of Öcalan to advance its goal, as a last resort. To this end, PKK supporters would appear in pro-Kurdish media to give the message that Öcalan suffers from solitude and mistreatment in prison. This may cause turmoil in the southeast. For this reason, 2012 will not be easy.

5) We are nearing the end of the Ergenekon case (the first indictment). On the other hand, Ergenekon is reorganizing itself. It is a known fact that the Ergenekon network has worked tirelessly to ensure that it is not labeled as a terrorist organization. To this end, some statements by the government should be taken into consideration. But it will be a surprise if the courts do not define Ergenekon as a violent organization based on the evidence they have. (Well, we observed that surprise in the Hrant Dink case). In this case, it should be noted that Ergenekon might be active or stage attacks SURE in 2012.

6) As I noted already, the shady elements inside the Tactical Mobilization Group, a military unit, that was being reorganized after its activities were ceased in connection with allegations that some of its members attempted to assassinate a deputy prime minister, have finished reorganizing. These units may become operative again. In this case, it is not be wrong to argue that additional attacks will be made.

7) Recently, an artificial discussion has been started regarding a religious community (the Gülen movement). I follow this discussion with great concern. I know the background of this discussion well. False propaganda has been disseminated to manipulate public opinion. This propaganda is preparation for future operations. The public discussion on missionaries that was initiated in 2004 and 2005 is a good example of this. Back then the public was told that there was church in every building, while nothing of this sort was true. This propaganda resulted in the murder of missionaries and Hrant Dink. Today such an environment is being created for the Gülen movement and this misinformation probably seeks to lay the ground to ensure that attackers like Ogün Samast and Yasin Hayal assault members of Gülen movement. This process is like a Gladio sword, which has two sharp sides. The groundwork is being laid to ensure that both Kurdish and Turkish nationalists attack this community. For this reason I am worried about 2012.

8) More importantly, when you write the sort of warnings that I write, people seek an ulterior motive. And this worsens the situation. This is the actual reason for why I am worried about 2012.

Published on Today's Zaman, 20 January 2012, Friday