Gezi's anniversary and Erdoğan's disproportionate politics

Mümtazer Türköne

Disproportionate force refers to the use of excessive force by security units; likewise, we can also speak of the disproportionate use of politics by powerful politicians against weaker political opponents.

Beating up a person who is merely shouting is a disproportionate response; using pepper spray against someone who is sitting in a show of protest is also the same. This style of politics is therefore disproportionate.

Last year, the police relied on excessive force during the Gezi protests. This year, on the first anniversary of the Gezi incident, the police did the same thing. A total of 25,000 police officers created a manmade block to prevent any protests in Taksim in İstanbul on Saturday. Reportedly, 250 protesters have been placed under arrest; 22 of them are under 18. The disproportionate political rivalry is the main reason for this excessive use of force.

There was nothing extraordinary about these protests last year; this was also the case this year as well. These protests would be considered normal anywhere else in the world because they are viewed as an exercise of the right to protest. The upper middle class is protesting against the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) administration. The protests are in the form of peaceful demonstrations. The demonstrators just want to attract attention. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan relied on the use of disproportionate force against these protesters; in general, he employed disproportionate politics against the Gezi incidents. In this manner, he created an anti-Gezi sentiment to consolidate his political base.

The Gezi protests did not threaten public order or public security. This was the case at least up until the involvement of marginal leftist groups. The government viewed these protests as a form of defiance against its authority and rule. By relying on disproportionate force, it tried to protect its authority rather than public safety. Was it successful? The government prevented protests thanks to the police force deployed at Taksim Square on May 1 and on May 31. There were 25,000 police officers blockading Taksim Square on Saturday. Was it a success? Obviously, government circles believe so because such a response holds some advantages.

Last year on May 31, the prime minister experienced a serious challenge to his rule for the first time. He intuitively realized that there were some opportunities within the crisis. Despite strong opposition from his allies, he adopted a harsh stance vis-à-vis the protests. There were serious differences between the Gezi protesters and his supporters and he seized on this opportunity. The AK Party support base was still based on poor people who paid little or no attention to environmental issues or human rights violations that the Gezi protesters were mainly concerned about. The prime minister demonized the protesters by adopting a harsh stance against them and then presenting them to his own supporters as enemies and targets.

With this move, he polarized people as Gezi protesters and support base. He used this opportunity to consolidate his power. He framed the Gezi demonstrators as the enemies of his supporters. He masterfully turned a social movement that emerged out of humane concerns into a marginal uprising on the axis of a political polarization. He held political rallies to stage an opposition to the Gezi protests. And in the end, he consolidated his support base.

Now he wants to win the presidential elections by employing the same strategy. The disproportionate politics the prime minister employs is based on the idea of marginalizing the refined and intellectual movements. The witch hunt against the Hizmet movement which he has admitted to means he wants to justify his existence via the presence of enemies. This is one of the most extreme types of polarization and populism. Unfortunately, it works.

Published on Today's Zaman, 02 June 2014, Monday