Orhan Oğuz Gürbüz
The winner of the local polls of March 30, 2014 is clearly the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) from a quantitative perspective. How did the opposition parties perform in these elections? As we start to look for an answer, we need to focus especially on the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP).
The punching of CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu by an assailant who is a member of the AK Party raised questions. Some columnists argued that this was the first step of a project launched to reshape the CHP. It is hard to say that the rhetoric adopted by the CHP to increase its appeal to religious voters was a total failure. The ruling AK Party's attacks and hate speech against the Hizmet movement in the wake of the graft probe of Dec. 17, 2013 initiated a new political regrouping in the Turkish political scene.
The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) had already initiated dialogue with conservative groups. And it managed to attract some conservative voters in the last elections. We can say that some conservative families saw the MHP as an alternative to the AK Party in the post-Dec. 17 era. Yet, the CHP's stance made the real impact. It nominated a nationalist politician for the mayoral position in Ankara and managed to achieve a big increase in its electoral support.
CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu's staunch position against the government's efforts to tamper with the country's legal system in the wake of the Dec. 17 probe paved the way for a new language. It will take some time before we can understand whether the CHP is really able to establish sound relations with religious groups. The CHP and the Hizmet movement acted with courage in overcoming this obstacle.
The CHP had to wrestle with the rueful memories of the single-party regime. More recently, the coup of Feb. 28, 1997 and the Ergenekon and Balyoz proceedings had indicated that the CHP was maintaining the same relationship with the tutelary system. Kılıçdaroğlu tried to get rid of this problematic relationship, saying "we are against all coups." It is wrong to say that Kemalist groups inside the CHP disapproved of the convergence with religious groups.
Reactions were voiced mostly by neo-nationalist groups that sought to influence the party from outside. Kılıçdaroğlu labored hard to divorce his party -- which still has big shortcomings in terms of becoming a true leftist party -- from the tutelage system. The CHP's communication with religious/conservative voters in its quest to move toward the center of the political spectrum was a positive step for the elimination of biases on both sides. In particular, religious/conservative voters made the big push in lifting the strong prejudices, with guidance from the Hizmet movement. Now, conservative groups will be able to search for better representation based on merits rather than on ideological affiliations or high-sounding rhetoric. A leftist party will be able to compete to represent these groups to the extent it pays respect to their fundamental rights and freedoms and offers non-discriminatory services.
The CHP actually sits on two main pillars. It claims ownership of the movement that established the republic and it represents the authoritarianism of the single-party regime; this forms the backbone of the CHP's history. In the post-Dec. 17 era, the CHP felt it necessary to move away from ideological discourse and closer to the political center. Will it be able to maintain this favorable move in the long run? It would be more useful for the CHP to question its relationship with the tutelary past. It should not allow its heritage to shackle its future progress. The CHP will remain as an actor in the political arena if it adopts a more freedom-oriented, civic and pluralistic language.
Published on Sunday's Zaman, 20 April 2014, Sunday