Dr. Fevzi Bilgin: ‘Nobody in Washington is buying the Turkish government's conspiracy theories'

Aydoğan Vatandaş*

Since Turkey was hit by the biggest corruption scandal in its history just several months before major elections, all the signs indicate that there will be a very turbulent period ahead.

While Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his propaganda team try to explain everything using conspiracy theories, claiming that the US or the Israeli lobby is plotting a dirty campaign against his government through the Hizmet movement, Dr. Fevzi Bilgin, the director of the Rethink Institute, notes that nobody in Washington is buying the Turkish government's conspiracy theories. “We increasingly see bitter editorials and op-eds in major newspapers. The tone of discussions in Washington think tanks is extremely critical.”

However, it is no secret that there is an ongoing rift between Erdoğan and the Hizmet movement. Dr. Bilgin says that the rift between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) -- or more so Prime Minister Erdoğan and the political/bureaucratic circle loyal to him -- and the Hizmet movement emerged after the AKP lost interest in democratic reforms and a new and democratic constitution, and focused instead on consolidating power, controlling the media and suppressing social opposition.

“Political parties are organizations that aim to win elections, operate the government and determine policy. A social movement, on the other hand, is a group of people who try to achieve certain general, social, political and religious goals. A social movement is not a political party but it may produce political parties. So, the rift between the AKP and the Hizmet movement must be assessed through this lens.”

Today's Zaman spoke to Bilgin about the recent developments in Turkey and the region.

A recent survey titled “The Birthplace of the Arab Spring: Values and Perceptions of The Tunisian Public in a Comparative Perspective” conducted by the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research in seven Muslim-majority countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) indicated that a large majority (between 70-80 percent) of Turkish people expressed favorable attitudes toward secular democratic politics. The survey also indicated that Tunisians, along with Lebanese and Turkish respondents, are much less conservative (or are more liberal) than those in Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. How would you interpret that result while a government, which is considered to have an Islamist agenda, rules Turkey?

I see three questions here. Let me address them all. First, it is not surprising that a large majority of Turkish people favor democratic secularism. Turkey is in fact a very secularized nation compared to other Muslim countries. Here I use the term “secular” sociologically. Even the pious, religious segments of society may subscribe to a form of public ethics that is not necessarily informed by religious traditions. Turkey's distinct interpretation of Islam and the Kemalist legacy are the culprits behind this outcome.

Second, the fact that Turkey and Tunisia are more liberal than the others may be attributed to a divergence in religious traditions and political culture. A religious tradition informed more by pluralist, distinct schools that have been in competition with each other tends to be more “liberal” than those shaped by a clerical monopoly. Third, Turkey's ruling AKP has never been an “Islamist” party like those we see in other parts of the Muslim world. The AKP is a populist, socially conservative party led by figures who have an Islamist background. Notwithstanding the AKP's characterization in the West as Islamist, the Turkish people do not see it that way. But this does not mean that the AKP will never pursue an Islamist agenda in the future.

Long history of secularism in Turkey

How was the perception of secularism in Turkey before and is it changing? How did it differ from other applications of secularism in some other secular systems?

Secularism as a type of or pillar of constitutional system had a long history in Turkey. Secularism was promoted during the final years of the Ottoman Empire to address the multiple ethnic and religious demands of minorities. In the hands of the founders of the republic, secularism turned into a sinister tool of modernization. Secularism was established as the cornerstone of the new constitutional system, which was openly hostile to religious traditions. Turkey began to question its secularism the moment it had the opportunity to do so, such as in the 1950s during the rule of the Democratic Party (DP). Since then, the Turkish form of secularism is a matter of political debate and contestation. The early form of secularism, which was forcefully advanced by the political/bureaucratic elite, was transformed into a dominant public culture in the hands of military/bureaucratic elites after 1960. This form of “republican” or assertive secularism was pretty much abandoned after Turkey demilitarized its politics in the years between 2007 and 2010. Turkey is now in the midst of redefining its secularism, I believe, in the direction of “liberal” secularism, which is more accommodating and protective of religious traditions.

Turkey is not alone is its quest. Non-Western countries such as Israel, India, Indonesia and now, of course, Arab countries, are struggling to define a constitutional system under which both secular and religious citizens can live and prosper. The republican form of secularism spearheaded in France and imported by Turkey and some other Muslim countries as part of their quest for modernization failed to produce democratic, stable, developed societies. But they were successful in nurturing secularized but not necessarily liberal generations who question religious traditions and worry about religious resurgence. A liberal form of secularism that is practiced in many advanced democracies may provide insights into a more inclusive form of secularism in Turkey.

While Prime Minister Erdoğan is believed to be an Islamist and is considered as a caliph by some of his followers, how do you interpret him suggesting secularism in Egypt some two years ago? Was it just pragmatism or something else?

That was an awkward moment indeed. I think Egyptians themselves were very confused by his suggestion. I am not sure what he meant by it because secularism in Egypt is understood differently than it is in Turkey. Also, the revolution in Egypt was not against secularism but against authoritarianism. Secular, religious, Muslim and Coptic Egyptians were among the revolutionaries. Contrary to the Turkish Constitution, the Egyptian constitutions did not embrace secularism. They even referred to Islamic law as the source of legislation. So I believe that suggestion was lost in translation.

Could you tell us about the reasons about the rift between the AK Party and the Hizmet movement?

First of all, we have to clarify the difference between a political party and a social movement. Political parties are organizations that aim to win elections, operate the government and determine policy. A social movement, on the other hand, is a group of people who try to achieve certain general, social, political and religious goals. A social movement is not a political party but it may produce political parties. So, the rift between the AKP and the Hizmet movement must be assessed through this lens.

The Hizmet movement is essentially a religious/humanitarian movement largely focused on education. The movement is not partisan but is also not apolitical. It has some declared political goals such as promoting democracy, universal human rights and freedoms. Thus it is fair to say that the Hizmet movement has been promoting a more democratic Turkey and supporting political actors who shared this vision. It is actually commendable that, given the lack of an effective liberal or secular movement, a socially conservative movement such as the Hizmet movement was mobilized to channel Turkey into a more developed democracy. And, if you look back at the history of the movement, there is a consistent trend that supports this proposition. The Hizmet movement has so far been targeted by military elites, Islamists, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and similar, but always non-democratic forces.

Accordingly, the rift between the AKP -- or more so Prime Minister Erdoğan and the political/bureaucratic circle loyal to him -- and the Hizmet movement emerged after the AKP lost interest in democratic reforms and a new and democratic constitution, and focused instead on consolidating power, controlling the media and suppressing social opposition. And lately, after alienating seculars and liberals during the Gezi protests, Prime Minister Erdoğan is not only alienating but also overtly assaulting a prominent, influential social movement. In a normal democracy, however, political actors tend to work with, and not against, such social movements.

Movement attached to pluralism, democratic values

Could you please tell us how the Hizmet movement reacts to secularism or perceives it?

The Hizmet movement is certainly not a fan of republican, assertive secularism which marked most of the history of the republic. In fact, the movement was frequently targeted by proponents of this view of secularism. The movement's attachment to democratic values and pluralism, focus on dialogue and recognition puts it closer to a politically liberal vision. The movement's approach to religious minorities and other marginalized groups in Turkey is a testament to that vision. It should be noted that when Islamists were pursuing a dream of Islamic state in Turkey in the 1990s, the movement was trying to bring together the religious and secular citizens of Turkey under an inclusive, workable and certainly novel public discourse.

Do you think the AKP has changed throughout the years?

It is not unusual for a political organization to change over the years and that is also what happened to the AKP. The AKP of 2002 was fragile, cautious but ambitious; the AKP of 2007 was validated and triumphant; the AKP of 2010 was visionary; and the AKP of 2014 is a leader's, i.e., Erdoğan's, party. The visionary party of 2010, in the wake of the retreat of the armed forces from politics, constitutional reform and ongoing economic growth, led to a great victory in the 2011 elections. In terms of political and economic success, the AKP had an upward trend all the way to 2011 and a downward trend since then.

In the last two to three years, troubles have sprung up in almost every area. There are many reasons for the downturn: a false confidence in the AKP leadership after the 2011 elections that they had now the absolute mandate and so it was time to enjoy the fruits of power; a consolidation of power around Erdoğan and the elimination of alternatives; a weakening political opposition by co-opting conservative leaders; and the suppression of critical voices in the media.

In terms of foreign affairs, for the AKP, the Arab Spring was a boon and bust at the same time. At the outset of the revolutions, Turkey emerged as a shining example that successfully fused Islam, democracy and economic growth in a very troubled region. The AKP leadership considered this a historic moment to push Turkey's grandeur in the region. This attempt was not taken lightly by regional rivals and eventually hit a wall in Syria. Notwithstanding, the regional power politics awakened neo-Ottoman and Islamist aspirations which, in turn, intoxicated the political discourse.

What are your thoughts about the corruption case in Turkey? How do you perceive the government's interference in the judicial system and prosecutors?

The corruption charges launched against ministers and businessmen favored by the prime minister himself are indeed very serious. Despite all the rumors, the AKP has never been challenged by serious corruption charges before. It is extremely important for a party that relies on a socially conservative basis not to be implicated in such wrongdoings that tend to be associated with secular -- read “immoral” -- parties. If the allegations are true, the association between conservative/Islamic politics and moral politics will be forever lost. But, unfortunately, we may never have the opportunity to determine that because of the assault by the government on the investigation.

How is it being perceived in the US?

Since Turkey is an important ally of the United States, the current developments and actions of the government in Turkey are causing great consternation in Washington. It is fair to say that the positive outlook which prevailed all the way up to 2013 is now absent. The government's efforts to put the blame on external forces or the Hizmet movement are considered desperate attempts to cover up corruption charges and divert criticism. Nobody in Washington is buying the Turkish government's conspiracy theories. We increasingly see bitter editorials and op-eds in major newspapers. The tone of discussions in Washington think tanks is extremely critical. On the other hand, the administration is cautious not to interfere directly in the debacle in Turkey. Perhaps they would like to see the outcomes of the elections first. In the meantime, direct assaults to the US, such as the smear campaign against the US ambassador to Turkey, are not tolerated. The language used by the administration against Turkey at the time was the toughest ever in recent history.

'We won't see an indictment soon'

Where do you think the proceedings in Turkey will go?

I do not think the proceedings will proceed at all. I do not believe we will see an indictment anytime soon. Even if we see one, it is going to be a watered down version because the prosecutors handling the case were reassigned and the judicial process has come under the control of the executive. Also, the government is in the works of drafting new bills to curb judicial oversight over its actions. Notwithstanding, the government appears to be losing the perception war. A negative public perception could be fatal before the critical elections. The very controversial and non- democratic acts of the government in the wake of the investigation and the language used by the leadership help reinforce the public perception that corruption really occurred, even before it is indicted. But, in the meantime, the separation of powers and judicial autonomy are being seriously undermined, almost irreversibly.

Profile: Fevzi Bilgin is the executive director of the Rethink Institute in Washington, D.C. His areas of expertise are constitutional politics, religion and politics, political liberalism, Turkish politics, Middle Eastern politics and US-Turkey relations. He received a BA from Ankara University and a Ph.D. in political science from University of Pittsburgh. His publications include recent books, “Understanding Turkey's Kurdish Question” and “Political Liberalism in Muslim Societies.”

* Investigative journalist based in New York.

Published on Today's Zaman, 24 January 2014, Friday