Drowning the Turkish Watergate, playing the Kurdish card

Mustafa Gürbüz

Amidst corruption probes against the government, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is passionately seeking allies in his war against critics. A fascinating coalition between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), a pro-Kurdish party, seems to be emerging.

Could Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed Kurdish leader, help in Erdoğan's war? If so, how would it fit into Öcalan's long-standing discourse against the AKP over the years, a discourse primarily shaped through the "deep state," popularly known as Ergenekon, narratives:

"In the elimination of Ergenekon, the United States had a major impact. Having a new plan for the Kurds, the US wanted to realize its aims. Yet, through active resistance, these people (the Ergenekon convicts) did not let the US realize its Kurdish project. The US does not want the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) to remain as it is and therefore, they develop conspiracies against Kurds. Those who were detained in the Ergenekon case are professional soldiers who had been trained by the US since the 1960s as intelligence and counter-guerilla officers. The US told them, “You screwed up!” and later, threw them out with the garbage. Now, the US wants to realize its (Kurdish) project through “soft Islam.”

In both Öcalan's speeches and pro-Kurdish party discourse, Erdoğan and Fethullah Gülen had been portrayed as a united front against Kurds -- until the recent rift between the AKP and the Gülen movement. They were both de-legitimized as co-opted traitors supporting “the soft Islam” project of the United States. Öcalan stated:

"One of the reasons for the US's elimination of them [the Ergenekon generals] was their approach to me and the PKK as well as their policies on the Kurdish question. That's why I'm portrayed as someone who has relations with Ergenekon. In fact, I never, ever collaborated with them since they had never consistent, realistic and convincing solutions to the Kurdish question. Similarly, they associate the PKK with Ergenekon. These forces, in fact, build relations with certain individuals in the PKK such as [former PKK leader Selim] Çürükkaya and Şemdin Sakık [a former commander of the PKK] in order to establish control over the PKK. I did not let them take power over me and the PKK. Yet, by employing the same type of tricks, they managed to get [Deniz] Baykal at the top of the CHP [People's Republican Party], and thereby, eliminated the leftist movement. Likewise, they got the MHP [Nationalist Movement Party] under control by making [Devlet] Bahçeli, the leader of the party. Against the alliance of the MHP and the CHP, the US has pushed forward its “soft Islam” project, and therefore, has controlled all sorts of conservative right movements by making them circle around the AKP and Erdoğan."

Lately, Öcalan and BDP leaders have continued to criticize Erdoğan, but not through “soft Islam” accusations. In the past two years, increasingly aware of Erdoğan's authoritarian tendencies, Kurdish ethno-nationalist discourse has shifted dramatically. They have pressed Erdoğan to release those jailed in the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), urban activists of the PKK, operations, allegedly conducted by the Gülen movement according to the pro-government media. For the first time, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists have marked a clear distinction between Erdoğan and Gülen in their public depictions: Erdoğan as a corrupt leader; Gülen as an American conspiracy, the “soft Islam.” Thus, Öcalan's recurring narratives about a US-led plot against Kurds have appeared to be consistent over the years.

As Erdoğan had enough reasons in his opinion to launch a war against Gülen, this discursive shift has begun to bear fruit. Seeing Gülen supporters as assassins, hashashin, Erdoğan's perception of the major enemy now overlaps with Kurdish ethno-nationalists, and thus, introduces a great opportunity to negotiate over the KCK case. Except for remarks about AKP, Öcalan's narratives above are fully supported by pro-government media: The US-led soft Islam (i.e. Gülen) has been the obstacle in the peace process since the Oslo negotiations. While Öcalan and the PKK are praised as a voice of reason, Gülen is depicted as foreign conspirator and staunch Turkish nationalist against Kurdish rights. In addition to the symbolic triumph, there is a strategic win for the PKK: The government pressure over the Gülen activists in the Southeast -- such as elimination of the prep schools -- would advance the KCK's entrenchment in civic life.

One question remains though: The Kurdish electorate has long perceived AKP and Gülen as a united front against the BDP. How would these recent shifts change the election outcomes in March? The BDP seems to be advantageous again since they pursue local policies that emphasize AKP-run municipalities' rotten involvement in corruption. And those Kurds who are critical of the PKK and now frustrated by the AKP have no other viable option than the BDP. Clearly, a win-win panorama for the pro-Kurdish party and Öcalan.

Published on Today's Zaman, 21 January 2014, Tuesday