Limits of political Islam: the other face of AKP (1)

Anwar Alam*

International consensus was emerging that Turkey was fast moving toward democracy. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Gülen movement were credited with bringing a new democratic space to the country, then consolidating and expanding it in the last decade.

Suddenly, in 2013, “Muslim democracy,” as the AKP government came to be known, lost momentum and started showing signs of political fatigue. All its recent moves and responses, including the mishandling of the Gezi protests; the party's decision to close down -- in what the government calls a “transformation” -- the private preparatory schools; launching an investigation into the Taraf journalist who published secret documents revealing a deal between the AKP government and the military, signed in 2004, that called for the monitoring and profiling of people linked to faith movements, in particular the Gülen movement; and calling the corruption cases a “conspiracy to destabilize the government” and dismissing several police chiefs who were investigating the corrupt officials -- ministers as well as their kith and kin -- all these are signs of political nervousness, a mixture of fear and arrogance that has gripped the government, which in its desperation was led to resort to the naked exercise of coercive power and utterly disregard the principle of rule of law. Worst, the government is using the people's mandate as a license to legitimize its illegal actions.

Even if the AKP wins in the coming elections -- which it will -- that shouldn't be used as a justification for crime. The government's unfortunate measures and policies have damaged Turkey's image and democratic credentials, strengthening and legitimizing the European Union's reluctance to welcome Turkey into the bloc and reinforcing widespread and misplaced thinking that Muslim nations are incapable of institutionalizing democratic rule.

How can one understand that a party that has ridden to political success for three consecutive terms, starting in 2002, with a comfortable majority on a platform of political democratization, civil liberties and economic development, and demonstrated the political will to achieve these goals -- by undertaking incremental measures such as exposing Ergenekon, symptomatic of what is called in Turkey the “deep state”; by punishing those who were found guilty, including military officers; by providing cultural and educational autonomy to minorities; by abolishing the fascist school pledge of allegiance; by allowing headscarves to be worn by employees of all public institutions, including Parliament, except the military and judiciary; and by keeping the general economy in good health, with remarkable achievements in the fields of infrastructure, education and health -- has reached a point where it prefers to rule by resorting to the arbitrary exercise of power; is dominated by a personality-driven, authoritarian mode of decision-making that often lacks any rational basis, as was showcased by the decision to close down the prep schools; and is mired in a culture of threats and intimidation? And that last thing, in an environment where there is no credible opposition to the party and its rule.

The popular explanation being circulated in the media, including Al-Jazeera (see Inside Story from Friday, Dec. 20, 2013), is that the Gülen movement and the AKP formed an informal alliance and cooperated with each other in marginalizing the army. Once the common enemy was defeated, both were left with no choice but to compete in the game of politics. Thus, according to media pundits, Erdoğan's decision to shut down the prep schools is an existential threat to the Gülen movement. Hence, the Gülen movement, or Gülen (who is currently living in the US), retaliated, orchestrating the series of corruption investigations through his influence and followers in the police, the judiciary and other organs of the state. The investigations involve AKP ministers and close associates of Erdoğan.

These narratives, even if they aren't politically motivated, at best reflect a modern mindset that is accustomed to seeing any conflict in terms of power dynamics. Those with such a mindset are quick to pick up terms like “parallel state” and “state within state” and use them liberally to describe any movement or organization, such as the Gülen movement, without understanding the semantics, context or history of such words. The terms “parallel state” and “state within the state” are normally applied to organizations that maintain a secret apparatus but fall short of their objective of capturing the state. All studies on the Gülen movement have conclusively demonstrated that it is a legal and transparent organization. It is strange that media pundits and critics never used these terms for the Christian missionary organizations that run vast networks of schools and hospitals both within and outside Western countries. A counterargument could be made that Christian missionary movements do not question the secular foundation of the nation-state or seek to acquire state power. Such is the case with the Gülen movement, in whose Islamic imagination the state is essentially a secular entity, and which supports a secular, impartial state and government. However, its Islamic identity is sufficient proof for “modern thinkers” to locate the Gülen movement in the narratives of the parallel state and the state within the state, with the sole purpose of delegitimizing the organization in the public eye, thereby lending support to illegal and illegitimate action by the state.

*Professor Anwar Alam is an instructor in the department of international relations at Zirve University.

Published on Sunday's Zaman, 22 December 2013, Sunday

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• Limits of political Islam: the other face of AKP (2)