Mümtazer Türköne
The discussion Mehmet Barlas recently raised in his column in the Sabah daily is widely interpreted as a manifestation of a power rivalry between the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Gülen movement.
But there is an irrational aspect to these comments. The only side that will be damaged in a war is the AK Party. The Gülen movement is a social movement; it is not a political party. And the atmosphere of the municipal elections has already settled in.
Everything is different during elections. Since the elections in 2014 are municipal, they won’t influence the fate of the government. But if the AK Party suffers a massive loss of votes, its reputation and strength will be opened to question. If that happens, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will be badly hurt ahead of the presidential election immediately after the municipal elections. For all these reasons, the AK Party will suffer the most from the appearance of a competition.
The AK Party managed to win the vote of one out of every two people in Turkey. Its election victory in 2011 was interpreted as social support for the eventual overthrow of the military custodian regime. With the end of the Ergenekon trial, this is no longer a reason to support the AK Party, which is why liberals are swiftly moving away from it. The party’s support is now contingent on factors like the continuation of stability, and economic and social welfare.
The steps taken toward solving the Kurdish question won’t earn the AK Party many votes. Given the PKK’s highly effective propaganda, a shift in the winds might even result in a loss of votes. At the end of the day, the municipal elections could turn into an instrument demonstrating a reaction against the AK Party’s authoritarian policies. This is why tension between the Gülen movement and the AK party and the campaign being waged by individuals close to the AK Party could result in an election disaster for the ruling party.
This is why it is surprising to see the tension climbing and the discussion heating up. It doesn’t make much sense to get involved in a power struggle with a civilian movement at a time when the AK Party is being blamed for the elimination of opposition journalists from the media. It’s hard to explain and understand. Two interpretations come to mind. The first one relates to the political style of Erdoğan. Erdoğan, instead of solving a problem when he heads into it, makes a point of escalating the problem and leaving the responsibility for a solution to the other side. So the expectation that the Gülen movement won’t contribute to the tension and end the crisis might be a reason why the discussion is growing. The second interpretation relates to the fact that none of those adding fuel to the fire have AK Party roots. One example here could be Mehmet Barlas. This reporter, known as a defender of liberal economic policies, is not a direct representative of the AK Party. Other pens waging a campaign against the Gülen movement share this characteristic. But even this is not enough to explain the current tension.
I think the problem lies in a paradox hidden in Erdoğan’s leadership style. He thinks that the people demand strong leadership from him and that he is getting votes because he is able to meet this demand. He believes that sharing his power would be a sign of weakness, and that backing down on challenging issues would shake his reputation in the eyes of the public.
This is why he resists backing down in the face of problematic situations and a challenging issues. His attitude in the face of the Gezi demonstrations and his silence today seem to stem from this paradox.
But this paradox is narrowing the AK Party’s voter base. For the first time, segments that have voted for the AK Party in the past are fighting each other.
Published on Today's Zaman, 12 August 2013, Monday